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“We can only hope that out of this controversy will come some real advances in the
management of a common and dreadful disease.”
Arnold Relman, M.D., Editor, New England Journal of Medicine. January 31, 1991.

The subject of this chapter is the history of the development of treatments for the
most common cause of dementia: Alzheimer’s Disease. By the middle of the 1980’s,
industrialized countries recognized that Alzheimer’s Disease was common, untreatable
and caused substantial harms and costs to individual patients, their family caregivers and
society. Moreover, demographic projections of the growth in the elderly population
predicted that these harms and costs would grow.1 Treatments were urgently needed, and
the clinical trial was the way to discover them. Years later, clinical trials have yielded
results. The 2001 American Academy of Neurology’s Evidence based guidelines
recommend acetylcholinesterase inhibitors and vitamin E as treatments for Alzheimer’s
Disease.2 Progress had occurred.
But the same Academy Guidelines that clearly state how these treatments have
value also contains an appendix that acknowledges there is no standard approach to
determining the magnitude of the benefits of dementia treatments.2 Other publications
report this and other limitations of Alzheimer’s Disease treatment trials. Common
themes are disagreements over the choice of endpoints, and the interpretation of
treatment versus control group differences in endpoints.3-11 The message is that the
communities of clinical medicine, clinical research, research regulation and industry have
not achieved a set of measures or approaches to analyze them that fulfill both the
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standards of valid science and clinical value. The result is an incoherence in the language
of benefit. The term “incoherence” describes the inability of these communities to select
and analyze measures of treatment benefit so that claims of validity and clinical value
hang together.
A language of benefit serves a number of interrelated ethical and scientific
functions. Hence, the costs of the failure to achieve a coherent language are significant.
Clinical investigators and institutional review boards struggle with weighing research
risks and benefits. Clinicians and patients struggle with the decision whether to use a
new treatment and the merits of changing or discontinuing treatments. Finally, public
and private policy makers cannot reach transparent and acceptable decisions about access
to and reimbursement for treatment. There is also a human cost. As long as incoherence
exists, clinical research results are of dubious value. As a result, further clinical trials are
done to try and achieve coherence. But these trials require significant commitments of
financial, scientific, regulatory and human resources. Of particular concern is the cost of
human resource: namely, human subjects, especially elderly persons with chronic and
ultimately fatal illnesses.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the interrelated scientific and ethical
issues that are the origins of how languages of treatment develop. The public image of
treatment development is that it follows a “rational path” that begins with preclinical
investigations and progresses logically with systematic and careful studies in humans (see
for e.g. ).12 These clinical trials use the most valuable of valid measures to establish
efficacy. Experts restrain their enthusiasm for encouraging reports until results are
replicated 13. Experts are not influenced by an “emotional side to the story.”14(pg. 528-529) In
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this model, validity and value are distinct and separate concepts that are adjudicated by a
disinterested community of scientists.15 A study is either valid or it is not, and validity
cannot be “traded off” for value.16
But the history of Alzheimer’s Disease treatment development suggests
otherwise. The approach to analyzing this history relies on analyzing the actual,
historically situated social interactions and causal routes that were involved in the
development of Alzheimer’s Disease treatments.17(pg. 48) The lessons are that Alzheimer’s
Disease treatments were not inevitable and need not be the way they are. They are the
result of a matrix of intersecting interests and ideas. Lessons of this matrix include that
ideas about what is Alzheimer’s Disease interact with the choice of measures of
Alzheimer’s Disease treatment efficacy, and that disagreements about validity and value
tend to overlap into one and the other and tradeoffs occur between them. Resolutions of
these disagreements largely follow the lines of authority and the power attached to them.
What follows is the history of Alzheimer’s Disease treatment development. This history
will focus on the development of symptomatic and disease slowing treatments for
Alzheimer’s Disease.

The history of Alzheimer’s Disease treatment.
Alzheimer’s disease is a chronic, progressive and ultimately fatal
neurodegenerative dementia. Typical symptoms include impairments in short-term
memory, language, personality, and the abilities to organize tasks and spatial
arrangements. Diagnostic criteria require deficits in two or more distinct cognitive
functions, such as verbal memory and executive function, that are significant enough to
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impair a person’s ability to perform their usual and everyday tasks such as managing
finances or cooking.18 In addition, because the disease often impairs a patient’s insight
and judgment into the scope and severity of their symptoms, clinicians typically obtain
collateral history from a knowledgeable informant. The key point here is that the
diagnosis of Alzheimer’s Disease relies on assessing the changes in each patient’s
baseline function and then linking these changes to declines in at least two cognitive
functions. The criteria do not describe a uniform set of measures of function and
cognition to diagnose Alzheimer’s Disease or the relative weights to apply to history
obtained from the patient versus the knowledgeable informant.
The staging of the disease is similarly multi-factorial in both what is measured
and the sources of information. Criteria specify assessment of a number of broadly
defined domains such as “judgement and problem solving” and either require a global
judgment of severity or use a weighted algorithm.19 Notably absent from staging criteria
are behavioral disorders such as agitation and psychosis because over the course of the
disease these symptoms wax and wane.
In summary, while the criteria for both the diagnosis and staging of the disease
show good reliability and validity, they require clinicians to assess a number of cognitive
domains, make judgments about the degree of impairment in them and then weight these
judgments into a final assessment. No one measure or set of measures defines both that a
person has Alzheimer’s Disease and how severe it is. In addition, patients, caregivers
and clinicians differ in the kinds of symptoms that matter to them.20, 21 As a result, when
investigators began to design clinical trials to test whether an intervention treats the
symptoms of Alzheimer’s Disease, they found that standards to diagnose and stage the
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disease did not readily translate into measures of treatment benefit. A new language was
needed.

Discovering a language of symptomatic benefit -- the acteylcholinesterase
inhibitors: The acetylcholinesterase inhibitors inaugurated the clinical science of
Alzheimer’s Disease drug development. As of 2001, four FDA approved medications are
marketed as safe and effective treatments for the symptoms of mild to moderate
Alzheimer’s Disease. In order of their approval, they are tacrine, donepezil, rivastigmine,
and galantamine.
Development of these drugs began in earnest in 1986, after the New England
Journal of Medicine published the results of Summers’ and colleagues clinical trial that
measured the symptomatic benefit of tacrine in 17 patients with Alzheimer’s Disease.22
The design involved a series of within subject controlled and open-label phases and
measured efficacy using both cognitive measures and “the daily global assessment.” The
authors concluded: “The degree of improvement has often been dramatic. One subject
was able to resume most of her homemaking tasks, one was able to resume employment
on a part-time basis, and one retired subject was able to resume playing golf daily.”22 (pg.
1243)

Although the drug required four times a day dosing, caused annoying side effect

such as nausea and diarrhea and required regular monitoring of liver enzyme activity,
these reports of dramatic functional improvements on the global measure suggested the
risks were worth the benefits. An accompanying editorial described the study as a step
along a “rational path” and praised it as “a triumph for the scientific method.”12(pg. 1287)
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The research inspired calls for rapid follow up studies to confirm the drug’s effectiveness
as a treatment for Alzheimer’s Disease.
Five years later, the New England Journal of Medicine revisited the Summers’
study with a “Special Report.” This series of three unusual articles included the Journal’s
editor Arnold Relman describing the controversy that surrounded both the decision to
publish the original article and the FDA’s subsequent investigation of Summers’ study,
the FDA’s summary of the violations by Summers, and a response by Summers and
colleagues.23 The critical issues FDA identified included basic failures of design and
conduct such as randomization, blinding and accurate recording of the global measure.
The FDA concluded the evidence to be the equivalent of uncontrolled and anecdotal
information.13
Relman defended the decision to publish the study. He disclosed that both
reviewers and the editors found the study imperfect and preliminary using methods not as
rigorous as might be desired. Relman quoted a referee to defend the decision to publish:
“The author’s results should encourage further studies, which in itself is reason for
publication.” Reviewing this decision, Relman reflected, “We can only hope that out of
this controversy will come some real advances in the management of a common and
dreadful disease.”23(pg.349)
The Summers study has at least two main lessons. First, it illustrates how
considerations of scientists’ perception of public desperation and hope as well as their
own experience of these emotions alter the threshold of scientific validity. Summers, the
editors at the New England Journal of Medicine, peer reviewers, and editorialists were all
willing to relax standards of clinical trial review because they felt that Alzheimer’s
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Disease is a common and dreadful disease and the scientific and clinical communities
needed encouragement. But alternatives existed. For example, the Journal could have
rejected the manuscript. This study could have joined previous studies of tacrine by
Summers that were published in less prestigious journals.24 Or, the editors could have
commissioned or themselves written an editorial that candidly presented the controversy
surrounding the publication decision and admitted the motivation to inspire future study.
This illustrates the second part of this lesson: the scientific community is unwilling to
publicly admit that these considerations influence their decisions. Instead, the editorial
concluded the study fit as the next logical step in a rational path.12 Were it not for the
FDA investigation and a settlement agreement that included publication of the
investigation and Summers’ response in a medical journal, the controversy would never
have been known to the public or to the scientific community.
The second lesson of the Summers study is in its measures of efficacy. In this
trial, the measures of efficacy were a combination of cognitive tests (names learning and
orientation tests) and a measure called “the daily global assessment.” The citation for the
global assessment was a previous study of tacrine by Summers in 12 patients with
Alzheimer’s Disease that simply states that “additional monitoring of THA effects were
done by a global physician assessment and evaluation of nursing notes.” 24 Despite this
ambiguity, this global measure provided the data for the vivid narratives of clinical
response that inspired the follow up studies. But the measure was unknown. The
subsequent studies of tacrine did not use Summers’ measures, but the study inaugurated
the debate over what measures of clinical response should be.
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The effect of the Summers’ trial was a rapid sequence of events that led to an
effort that combined the financial and patient resources of the Alzheimer’s Association,
National Institute on Aging, Warner-Lambert, and the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to design and conduct clinical trials of tacrine. The three multi-site, placebo
controlled randomized trials of tacrine followed the controversial 1986 New England
Journal of Medicine study illustrated the challenge of measuring a language that unified
both valid and valuable efficacy data for the treatment of Alzheimer’s Disease.
In the first study, subjects who received tacrine compared to those who received
placebo showed a statistically significant 2.4 point difference in the mean performance on
the measure of cognition, but unlike Summers’ promising study, did not show significant
differences on the global measure of change.25 An accompanying editorial pronounced
the end of the cholinergic hypothesis for symptomatic benefit 26 and reinforced this view
in response to critical letters to the editor.27 In an explicit recognition of the resource
issues at stake, the editorialist wrote “I believe that time, effort, and money will be better
spent in developing treatments that attack fundamental problems of neuronal
degeneration than in designing a ‘better’ acetylcholinesterase inhibitor.”27(pg. 810)
But the nascent Alzheimer’s Disease research community declined this shift in
resources. In both the article’s “discussion” and the hearings of the FDA’s Peripheral
and Central Nervous System Drugs Advisory Committee that reviewed the results, the
debate centered on the interpretation of the mixed results. The article described both the
measure of cognition and the global as the primary measures, but its discussion section
suggested that the changes on the cognitive measure were sufficient to establish that
tacrine was effective. Representatives of Warner-Lambert were more forthright in this
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interpretation. They argued that the study was built around the ADAS and its cognitive
subcomponents and this outcome measure deserves the closest attention.14(pg71)
Ultimately, the Advisory Committee judged the mixed result inconclusive and voted not
to recommend tacrine for approval. Additional data reviewed four months later failed to
change the decision.28

The search for the perfect language -- the global measure: The tacrine trials
raised a number of issues specific to tacrine (including the proper doses of drug, the use
of cross-over design, the duration of washout periods). They also raised the interrelated
scientific and ethical issues that are the origins of creating a coherent language of benefit:
the choice and interpretation of measures of a treatment’s benefit.
The failure of the first pivotal trial was a disappointment and also a surprise.
Summers reported that a global measure detected dramatic and frankly poignant
responses to tacrine: retirees playing golf and resuming part-time work. In contrast, the
subjects in the subsequent trial failed to show responses on the global measure. General
consensus was that the measure of cognition (the Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale
or ADAS) was a valid measure of changes in patient cognitive function. But the ADAS
was a long scale that was not used routinely either by clinicians or even most
Alzheimer’s Disease Centers. The statistically significant differences between the
average scores of control and intervention groups were difficult to translate into a valued
measure of symptomatic benefit. In short, did clinicians notice a 2.4 point change?
Statistically significant differences were also found in measures of functional decline, but
these changes raised the same question: were they clinically significant? Attention turned
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to the choice and interpretation of measures to establish “clinically valuable change.”
Specifically, the debate turned on two issues: the structure of the global assessment, and
the role of the caregiver in the assessment of change.
The basic structure of a global measure of change is that a rater assesses a patient
at baseline and then after some time interval reassesses the patient.29, 30 The rater
compares baseline and reassessment data to judge whether the person has stayed the same
or has had a clinically significant “marked,” “moderate,” or “minimal” decline or
improvement. There was general agreement that these qualities substantiate why the
measure is “real world,” “ecologically valid,” and “holistic.”29-31 But there was
significant disagreement about how to perform a global measure.29, 30 A review of these
disagreements shows confusion in the distinction between what is a problem of validity
versus what is a problem of value. Ultimately, while science was the playing field for
these disagreements, the resolution followed lines of authority and power.
A general principle of instrument assessment is that reliability precedes validity.32
That is, an instrument must be reliable in order to be valid. In the case of the global,
evidence suggested that the measure of global change had only fair reliability.33 This
largely reflected the lack of structure to the measure. It did not specify the domains a
clinician should assess, how to rate them or how to weigh them. Basic principles of
measurement science are that increasing structure improves a measure’s reliability. But
greater structure has another effect that runs contrary to the value of the global: it would
diminish the measure’s face and content validity. Specifically, structure increases
sensitivity to detect change, but this change might be clinically insignificant and not
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reflect clinically significant change: the property was at the heart of the global’s value as
a measure of treatment efficacy.29, 30
A second controversy was the sources of information for making a global
rating.29, 30 The focus was on the role of the patient’s knowledgeable informant, typically
a family caregiver. There was general agreement that the baseline interview should
include interviews with patient and caregiver, but there was disagreement about whether
the rater should interview the caregiver in the follow-up interviews.
FDA offered two arguments against caregiver input. First, its statutory mandate
required that measures of treatment of the disease should be separate from measures of
safety. Caregiver input would introduce information about side effects.29 These data
would confound an assessment of efficacy. In other words, safety data (such as stomach
upset) would contaminate an assessment of improvements in symptoms. Second,
officials argued on the basis of effect sizes. A skilled clinician who alone detected
change using an unstructured global would detect significantly large enough change to
say that a drug has clinically meaningful benefit. An FDA official explained:

Those of us in the FDA who were interested in an effect-size issue – which I don’t
think we’ve solved, and that speaks to clinical significance – wanted very much to
have something that would allow us to detect, independently of somebody’s
arbitrary set of rules, something that was large enough for clinicians to see; the
argument being, if they could see it, at least that was a minimum standard. 30
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In response, clinical investigators argued that the practice of Alzheimer’s Disease
clinical care relied on an interview with knowledgeable informants, especially the
patient’s caregiver. This interview disclosed important information such as patient
behavior and the abilities to perform everyday activities of daily living. Absent these
information, the clinician’s global would simply be a global assessment of patient
cognitive function.21 To deprive a clinician access to this information during a global
rating hindered the ratings face and content validity. These clinicians maintained that the
clinician rater could be kept blinded to reports of side effects and forbidden from
inquiring about them during follow-up interviews.
The debates over the degree of structure and role of the caregiver show a tension
between trying to simultaneously maximize a measure’s validity and value. For example,
the argument for access to the caregiver featured improving the measure’s face and
content validity, which in turn improved its value. In contrast, the argument against
access focused on the impact on the value of measuring small changes. The argument for
more structure appealed to improving the measure’s reliability. In contrast, the argument
against more structure focused on the limited value of detecting trivial effects. In sum,
the measure could not be maximally valid and valuable, but only valid enough for a given
sense of value.
At the core was a disagreement about what kinds of symptoms reflect
Alzheimer’s Disease and thus the best measure to document improvement in the
symptoms of Alzheimer’s Disease. One view of Alzheimer’s Disease is that measures of
cognition are the best expression of an “antidementia effect” because Alzheimer’s
Disease is a cognitive disorder.9, 34 Hence, improvements in measures of cognition reflect
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improvements in the disease. Thus, a clinician’s global without caregiver input is a valid
and valuable measure of change. Another view of Alzheimer’s Disease is that measures
of functional impairment are the best expression of Alzheimer’s Disease.35 Hence,
improvements in measures of function reflect improvements in cognition. Thus, a global
measure should include caregiver input or even be exclusively made by the caregiver. In
short, ideas about what is Alzheimer’s Disease impact upon judgments about what is the
best measure of Alzheimer’s Disease treatment.
The outcome of these debates was that subsequent trials of acetylcholinesterase
inhibitors used a semi-structured global with caregiver input. The interviewer was
instructed not to inquire about side effects. Some trials included a caregiver rated global,
but this was as a secondary endpoint.36 This outcome largely followed along the lines of
power and authority. FDA championed the unstructured interview that excluded the
caregiver. 29 Officials advocated for this global on the basis of effect sizes. But this
position exceeded their authority. Approval focuses on whether statistically significant
differences exist between treatment and control, not on the size of the difference. The
expert medical community defines what is a clinically significant effect and how to
measure it, and the expert community wanted a semi-structured measure that included an
interview with the caregiver.37 But did this measure translate into a coherent language of
treatment? The deliberations of the expert community suggest the answer to this question
was a qualified “maybe.”

Translating the language of symptomatic benefit – the approval of tacrine. The
controversies over the measures of benefit used on the three pivotal tacrine studies were
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on full display at the third meeting of the Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drugs
Advisory Committee. The committee’s decision would not determine the approval
tacrine. Only FDA had that authority. But its decision would strongly influence the
FDA’s decision and thereby set the standard for the design and review of future
symptomatic treatments for dementia. The FDA’s instruction to the committee was to
answer the “critical question” whether substantial evidence supported that tacrine was
effective. FDA emphasized that this was not a statistical issue but a clinical judgment by
expert professionals.38 It was, in effect, a judgment of the value of the measured benefits
of tacrine. The committee members and invited guests drawn from the leaders of
neurology clinical research and Alzheimer’s Disease clinical trials (including
investigators from previous tacrine trials) were being asked to view the evidence from a
different perspective: the perspective of clinicians and patients.
The committee members’ discussions showed general agreement that tacrine had
a statistically significant effect on the primary endpoints. But the members took sides on
how to make the judgement that these effects constituted a treatment benefit. In a phrase
that recurred throughout the meeting, the members struggled to translate these data into
“real world” language. Two issues articulated this struggle and the positions of the
different sides: the value of the primary endpoints, and how to interpret the results of the
global measure. Despite these issues, the committee voted unanimously to recommend
approval and FDA ultimately approved of tacrine as a symptomatic treatment for patients
with mild to moderate Alzheimer’s Disease. Several committee members cited Leonard
Berg’s summary on the evidence as an acceptable resolution of the disagreements. Berg
engaged in an imaginary clinical encounter with a patient and family:
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You can’t expect it [tacrine] to do very much for you. There is a very small
chance that it will help you a good deal, there is a little better chance that there
will be some measurable improvement that some people might say is clinically
significant. How important that degree of improvement is depends on your
perception, not on my perception, and we know that there are many people who
will be delighted and call very important something that many of us around the
table would consider of little or no impact.38(pg. 219)

Since the publication of the Summers study in 1986, seven years of debates about
the choice of the endpoints and how to interpret them were effectively set aside: benefit
depends on your personal perspective. Berg’s summary was as “value neutral” as the
committee could be in its efforts to answer a value-laden question. The message was that
the committee is in no position to impose a standard of benefit. But, his comment
suggested the lingering skepticism over the value of the clinician rated global (“How
important that degree of improvement is depends on your perception, not my
perception”).
Berg offered a follow-up comment that illustrated a problematic consequence of
this perspective: “I would also say, because as a treating physician, I have to pay
attention to some to cost-benefit ratios, that the cost is substantial not only for family, but
for third-party payers and society at large.” This point raised the issue of whether the
drug was cost-effective. However, FDA approval does not include pharmacoeconomic
issues: “But across this consultation table we are talking about benefit versus risks, and
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the benefits appear to be small, but the chance of very serious side effect to the drug
appears to be small.”38(pp. 219-20) Lines of authority rendered pharmacoeconomic issues
moot, but the comment heralded disagreements that followed the approval of tacrine and
other acetylcholinesterase inhibitors.
In countries such as Great Britain and Canada where approval or state
reimbursement is linked to assessments of both efficacy and cost-effectiveness, tacrine
was not approved and subsequent acetylcholinesterase inhibitors such as donepezil were
the cause of considerable debate. For example, in Canada some provinces did not
reimburse donepezil while others imposed criteria based on patient baseline mini mental
state exam (MMSE) scores and changes in these scores. The irony of these criteria is that
the MMSE is one of a few measures that are widely used in Alzheimer’s Disease clinical
practice, but it only measures cognitive function. Much like changes in the ADAS-cog,
the clinical significance of a few points of change is opaque. After seven years of
research, the language of benefit in clinical trials to develop Alzheimer’s Disease
symptomatic treatments was adequate for a panel of experts but it remained difficult to
translate into the language of clinical practice or policy.

Discovering a language of disease progression -- the vitamin E debate:
Acetylcholinesterase inhibitors were developed according to a model of symptomatic
benefit. But the accumulated evidence of the many trials generated a discussion: do these
drugs slow the progression of disease? The FDA Advisory Panel that voted to approve
tacrine dismissed it as a topic for review. A member remarked “I would submit there is
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no way to give an answer to that at the present time and we shouldn’t waste any time
discussing it.”38(pg. 219) But the issue did not disappear.
One consequence of the acetylcholinesterase studies was that they assembled an
infrastructure of university based Alzheimer’s Disease clinical investigators that
organized into the NIA-funded Alzheimer’s Disease Cooperative Study (ADCS) whose
mission included studying potential treatments for Alzheimer’s Disease, especially
treatments that did not have the support of industry. The ADCS’ first clinical trial was a
24 month long placebo controlled study of the individual and combined effects of vitamin
E and selegiline on patients with moderate Alzheimer’s Disease.35 The trial’s outcome
measure was time to the onset of any one of the following events: death, nursing home
placement, dependence in two or more of three basic activities of daily living (eating,
grooming and using the toilet), and progression to severe stage disease. Efficacy was
defined as a significant delay in the time to achieving this combined endpoint. In contrast
to studies of acetylcholinesterase inhibitors, measures of cognition were secondary
endpoints.
The results published in the April 1997 New England Journal of Medicine showed
subjects who received vitamin E or selegiline had significantly greater delays in the time
before they reached one of the four endpoints and no significant differences in their
performance on the secondary measures of cognition. Based on the criteria of primary
endpoints, the trial was a success. The authors concluded vitamin E and selegiline slow
the progression of Alzheimer’s Disease. The media reported the arrival of two new
treatments for Alzheimer’s Disease.
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But the collective results of primary and secondary endpoints presented mixed
results. Treatment to control group differences existed in a series of functional endpoints
but no differences existed in cognitive measures. The authors’ discussion of these results
engaged the issue of what is the best measure of disease progression. In a clear
recognition and then dismissal of the paradigm developed for acetylcholinesterase
inhibitors, they wrote: “Although cognitive measures have typically been the index of
symptomatic improvement measured over a short interval, they may not be the best
measures of disease progression.”35(pg 1221) The authors raised the provocative, even
revolutionary, point that a “cognitive measure” such as the ADAS may not be the best
way to measure effects on the disease. They cited the result of significant treatment to
control differences in performance on measures of instrumental activities of daily living
that require cognitive function and concluded “Perhaps functional and occupational
measures of cognitive capacity are better indicators of disease progression than
psychometric measures.”35(pg. 1221) The authors concluded “In patients with moderately
severe impairment from Alzheimer’s Disease, treatment with selegiline or alphtocopheral slows the progression of disease.”35(pg. 1216) This claim makes two points: the
drugs treat Alzheimer’s Disease and the measures that established this are measures of
disease progression.
Unlike the acetylecholinesterase inhibitor trials, the ADCS study’s endpoints were
highly coherent across clinical trial and clinical practice. The investigators viewed them
as valid and arguably most caregivers and clinicians would accept them as valuable too,
although the benefit of survival, of living longer with Alzheimer’s Disease, is highly
contingent on assessments of patient quality of life.39 But to the clinical trial world the
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study was incoherent. A critical accompanying editorial, “Treatment of Alzheimer’s
Disease – Searching for a breakthrough, settling for less,” questioned the validity of the
results. The criticisms included the appropriateness of the choice of the endpoints.9
While valuable to clinicians, the authors argued they could not accurately measure
disease progression.
Their criticism went as follows. Death is not a direct consequence of Alzheimer’s
Disease. Nursing home placement is more closely related to behavior problems and “the
diminished tolerance of the caregivers” than to impaired cognitive ability. The failure to
affect cognitive test scores was “perplexing.” The editorialists speculated that “Perhaps
the treatment effect was only symptomatic, affecting behavior but not the underlying
disease process.”9(pg. 1247) The editorial summarized the criticism: “The composite end
point is also an uncertain surrogate for the progression of Alzheimer’s disease because
the end point may be reached for reasons unrelated to disease progression – for example,
an early death due to cancer, or placement in a nursing home because of the illness of a
spouse.”9(pg. 1246)
The editorial was significant not only for what it said but who said it: David
Drachman and Paul Leber. Drachman was a co-investigator on acetylcholinesterase
trials,25 co-author of the diagnostic criteria for Alzheimer’s Disease,18 and member of the
FDA Advisory Panel that recommended approval of tacrine.38 Leber was the director of
the FDA’s neuropsychopharmacology division. He was intimately involved in the
history of Alzheimer’s Disease treatment development. In effect, a member of the
dementia expert community and the head of the FDA were on record saying that the
ADCS study was invalid and thus of little or no value.
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The political magnitude of the conflict is significant. The ADCS vitamin E trial
was not the effort of a small group of investigators and subjects. Twenty-three Federally
funded sites at academic medical centers enrolled 341 subjects. The study’s authors and
co-investigators included many who persons were participated in the acetlycholinesterase
trials. Leber, the co-author of the critical editorial, presided over the FDA’s development
of guidelines for the review and approval of antidementia drugs. In short, the ADCS
vitamin E trial and its accompanying editorial displayed the radical difference in the
medical scientific community over what measures serve as both valid and valued
language of Alzheimer’s Disease treatment. Subsequent evidence-based reviews of the
study reflect this incoherence.2, 11, 40, 41

The current state of Alzheimer’s Disease treatment development.
The acetylcholinesterase and vitamin E trials established a worldwide network of
Alzheimer’s Disease clinical trial centers, industry funding, regulatory standards for
review and approval, and a basic template of trial design and analysis. But the products
of this effort have been controversial. Three acetylcholinesterase inhibitors are marketed
as symptomatic treatment for Alzheimer’s Disease, but skepticism lingers over claims of
their effectiveness.3-10 Tacrine has essentially faded from use though its champion
remains insistent it is beneficial. As recently as 2000, in the libertarian Medical Sentinel
(a journal “dedicated to the pursuit of liberty, free markets and integrity in medical
research”), Summers summarized the tacrine trials and concluded that more patents
should be treated with it.42
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The “dual endpoint” strategy of a cognitive measure plus a clinician rated global
achieves regulatory requirements, but it is not the widely accepted paradigm for trials.
European drug regulators add a third endpoint: a measure of function,43 and trials often
have functional measures as primary endpoints and cognitive measures as secondary
endpoints.44-46 The rhetoric of Alzheimer’s Disease treatment has transformed from
symptomatic response to the preservation of function, that is, patients may not noticeably
improve on the acetylcholinesterase, but they will decline slower.45 Experts hint that the
drugs may slow progression (Winblad, Brodaty et al. 2001), though none of the drugs
have achieved regulatory approval as disease slowing and no clear consensus exists on
how to establish that a treatment slows Alzheimer’s Disease.34
In sum, the histories of the study of acetylcholinesterase inhibitors and vitamin E
have merged. The 1992 message of the critical editorial that accompanied the negative
tacrine study that followed up Summers’ inspirational but invalid study lingers: “time,
effort, and money will be better spent in developing treatments that attack fundamental
problems of neuronal degeneration than in designing a ‘better’ acetylcholinesterase
inhibitor.”27(pg. 810) That is, the focus of research resources ought to be on establishing
valid and valuable endpoints to establish disease slowing.

Conclusion.
The clinical trial is widely recognized as the best way to establish the safety and
efficacy of treatments. It is the cornerstone for the development of rational therapeutics
and the combined forces of evidence based medicine and both public and private
managed care regard it as a critical standard to determine what is the standard of care.47
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This essay has focused on the history of Alzheimer’s Disease researchers’ efforts to use
the clinical trial. While the image of drug development is that of linear progress that
begins at the benchside and then moves through progressive phases of clinical research
that begin with safety and dose finding studies, the history of Alzheimer’s Disease
treatment development describes a different process. Four features describe this process.
The first feature is the emotions of the scientific establishment. Researchers and
reviewers publicly discuss their role using rhetoric that is measured and dispassionate
while subjects are described as desperate, even irrational, in their pursuit of treatment
benefit in research. The clinical trial is seen as an essential institution to prevent the rise
of irrational therapeutics. But the history of Alzheimer’s Disease drug development
suggests that researchers and subjects may share more emotions than is typically
portrayed. The controversy surrounding the publication of the Summers’ study in the
New England Journal of Medicine is a rare glimpse into the influence of desperation and
hope on peer reviewers, editorialists and editors.
The second feature of this process is the breakdown of the validity and value
distinction. Validity is portrayed as a threshold concept. A study is either valid or it is
not and validity cannot be “traded off” for value. But the history of Alzheimer’s Disease
treatment development suggests the distinction blurs. Disagreements about validity and
value tend to overlap into one and the other and tradeoffs do occur. The history of the
global measure and the vitamin E trial suggests that scientists begin with a vision of value
and search for a valid measure that supports this vision.
The third feature is the qualities of a coherent language of treatment benefit.
Fields such as hypertension, diabetes and AIDS have made rapid progress in the
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development of therapeutics because common measures describe both what is the disease
and whether it is being treated. For example, in the case diabetes, a clinical trial will
measure the subjects’ glycosylated hemoglobin A1C concentration (HGA1C). This
measure has a number of meanings. It defines diabetes. That is, when it is above a
threshold value, a person has diabetes. It also defines the treatment of diabetes.
Clinicians and patients follow the value to inform them both of the severity of disease
and the success of treatment. The lower the HGA1C, the more successful the treatment.
In sum, a HGA1C is both a valid and valued measure. The development of treatments for
other chronic diseases such as hypertension and osteoporosis follow a similar model.
Blood pressure elevation and reduction of bone mineral density define the presence of
disease and changes in these measures define successful treatment. The history of AIDS
treatment development shows how these measures can change. Initially, a change in
CD4 lymphocyte count defined treatment benefit. Now, changes in the levels of viral
load are included in the assessment of treatment benefit.
The point is that ideas about what a disease is interact with definitions and
measures of what are effective treatments of that disease. The language to express these
ideas works when (1) validity and value are expressed using common terms, (2)
researchers, clinicians and patients accept the terms, and (3) clinicians and patients can
measure and talk about the language. In the case of Alzheimer’s Disease, disagreements
about whether Alzheimer’s Disease is a “cognitive disorder” or a “functional disorder”
led to different ways to talk about what is Alzheimer’s Disease. As a result, a language
of treatment is difficult to cohere.
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The fourth feature of drug development is that it confirms what other histories
have shown,48 that the claim of treatment benefit depends on the network of interested
parties that attach the label of “benefit” and that these parties exercise power and
persuasion to resolve these disagreements. Three core constituencies are involved in this
network: funders (both public agencies such as NIA and private industry such as WarnerLambert), researchers, research regulators (the FDA). In the case of some disease, such
as AIDS, a fourth constituency is involved: patients with the disease.49 An essential issue
negotiated among these constituencies is a coherent language of benefit. The history of
Alzheimer’s Disease drug development shows how among the constituencies, FDA is a
kind of partially shackled giant. The agency has significant control over setting standards
for trial design and review, but these standards are constrained by its statutory authority
to regulate the marketing claims on industry and responding to the consensus of the
“expert community.” While FDA certainly influences issues of clinical significance and
pharmacoeconomics, these matters are largely left to the community of researchers in
collaboration with industry, who, as the first point indicated, are themselves motivated by
desperation and hope.
The overall lesson of the history of Alzheimer’s Disease treatment discovery is
that treatments are not inevitable and need not be the way they are. Thousands of patients
have participated in Alzheimer’s Disease clinical trials and yet results remain in dispute.
Disagreements about the interpretation of research results are framed in the dispassionate
language of science but are largely resolved along lines of authority and power. The
critic must ask: how well does the system represent the interests of the people it intends
to serve?
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